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RECENT DECISION
MUTUALITY OF ESTOPPEL-AFFIRMATIVE USE OF COLLATERAL ESTOPPEL-CONFLICTING JUDGMENTS AFFECTING
SIMILARLY SITUATED CLAIMANTS
The defendant's jeep collided with plaintiff's truck driven by Farnum. Farnum recovered a 5,000 dollar personal injury award from the
defendant and two months later plaintiff began an action for property
damage in the amount of 8,250 dollars. Plaintiff's motion for summary
judgment' on the ground that the judgment in favor of Farnum should be
conclusive in plaintiff's action by application of res judicata was granted.
Since the issues in both actions were identical in that both turned on
defendant's negligence and the absence of contributory negligence on
Farnum's part, the defendant is bound by the prior determination although plaintiff can not be. B. R. DeWitt Inc. v. Hall, 19 N.Y.2d 141,
226 N.E.2d 195.278 N.Y.S. 2d 596 (1967).
Despite an impressive history of criticism2 the courts of a generation
ago gave uniform respect to the necessity for mutuality of estoppel.' This
requirement of mutuality has as its proper function the restriction of
collateral estoppel4 to those bounds in which its operation is not inconsistent with the in personam nature of a lawsuit.'
The past three decades have seen this theory fall into disrepute in
several jurisdictions, most notably New York and California. As one
often quoted commentator would have it, the landmark 1942 California
1. N.Y. Civ. PRAc. § 3212 (McKinney 1963).
2. J. BENTHAM, RATIONALE OF JUDICIAL EVIDENCE 579-0 (1827); Cox, Res
Adjudicata: who Entitled to Plead, 9 VA. L. REG. (is.) 241 (1923); Defending
mutuality: von Moschzisker, Res Judicata,38 YALE L. 3. 299, 303 (1929).
3. According to the classic formulation of the doctrine, if both parties would not
be bound by a prior judgment neither would be. E.g., Tobin v. McClellan, 225 Ind. 335,
73 N.E.2d 679 (1947); Hitt v. Carr, 62 Ind. App. 80, 109 N.E. 456 (1915); 1 A.
FREXAN, JUDGMENTS 428 (5th ed. 1925).
4. By application of the doctrine of collateral estoppel, a party to a lawsuit may
be barred from asserting or denying a given issue of law or fact adjudicated in a previous
action in which that party or someone in privity with him has participated. 2 A. FREEMAN,
JUDGMENTS § 639 at 1346-47 (5th ed. 1925). The operation of this "bar" is distinguished
from the operation of "merger" in conjunction with res judicata which pertains to the
attempted second litigation of not a mere issue but of the entire cause of action. If a
cause of action is tried, all issues whether or not litigated are merged into the final judgment and may not be reopened, whereas successful invocation of collateral estoppel
demands that an identical issue of either law or fact have reached judgment on the
merits. See Cromwell v. County of Sac, 94 U.S. 351 (1876).
5. Moore & Currier, Mutuality and Coltc.hsiveness of Judgments, 35 TuL L. Rxv.
301 (1961) [hereinafter cited as Moore & Currier].
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case of Bernhard v. Bank of America,' "rammed... the widest breach
in the citadel of mutuality."' As will be noted, however, the concept
has retained a limited scope of operation. It remained for the New York
high court to administer the final blow with DeWitt:

"...

mutuality,"

in the court's words, "is a dead letter."'
The very real sense in which the holding may be said to deal
mutuality a blow not yet delivered by previous decisions' may best be
comprehended by ranking those decisions on a scale, the progressions of
which represent an increasing divergence from the ideal that each citizen
may avail himself of every possible opportunity to present his position in
a favorable light. The most common exception to the general rule exists
in cases of derivative liability in which a judgment favorable to the party
primarily liable forecloses an action by the same plaintiff against the
person secondarily liable.'" The majority reaches the same result although
the party secondarily liable was the party sued initially. The inequity is
minimal since the claimant has had his day in court.
6. 19 Cal. 2d 807, 122 P.2d 892 (1942).
7. Zdanok v. Glidden Co., 327 F.2d 944, 954 (2d Cir. 1964) (Friendly, J.).
8. B.R. DeWitt Inc. v. Hall, 19 N.Y.2d 141, 147, 278 N.Y.S.2d 596, 601, 225
N.E.2d 195, 198 (1967).
The court issued the potentially misleading comment that by virtue of Berntard and
its progeny the doctrine had become "so undermined as to be inoperative." Id. at 144,
278 N.Y.S.2d at 598, 225 N.E.2d at 196. Such an obituary would be premature if applied
to that majority of jurisdictions in which the last decision of record expressly approves
the' doctrine. For a summary of cases see the appendix compiled in Currie, Civil
Procedure: The Tempest Brews, 53 CALIF. L. REv. 25, 38 (1965); See also Currie,
Mutuality of CollateralEstoppel: Limits of the Bernhard Doctrine, 9 STAN. L. REV. 281
(1956); Moore & Currier, supra note 5, at 304. In their two most recent decisions
Indiana courts, for example, have remained firmly within the majority camp: Tobin v.
McClellan, 225 Ind. 335, 73 N.E.2d 679 (1947) ; Hegarty v. Curtis, 121 Ind. App. 74,
95 N.E.2d 706 (1950). In the latter case the reported facts do not appear to justify a
reliance on mutuality.
A sufficient number of states have gradually emulated the comparatively radical case
law of New York and California on this point to justify the use by recent commentators
of the much abused description "trend." See Thames, Mutuality in Collateral Estoppel:
Never the Twain Should Meet, 37 Miss. L.J. 244 (1966) ; Comment, Mutuality of
Estoppel: Its Status in Nebraska, 45 NEB. L. Rev. 613 (1966); Note, Mutuality of
Estoppel: McColrt v. Algiers in Context, 1967 Wis. L. REv. 267.
In contrast to the sweeping pronouncement of DeWitt, however, these other state
courts have sanctimoniously declared their reverence for the general principle while
carving out an ever growing category of so-called exceptions. Justice Traynor has
subsequently averred in Teitelbaum Furs, Inc. v. Dominion Ins. Co., 58 Cal. 2d 601, 605,
25 Cal. Rptr. 559, 560, 375 P.2d 439, 440 (1962), that his opinion in Bernhard "expressly
abandoned" the requirement of mutuality, but the otherwise forcefully worded opinion
did at one juncture hedge to the extent of employing the term "exception!' and perhaps
partially as a consequence of the manner in which that reference is paraphrased in the
unofficial report's headnote, most courts have alluded to "the Bernhard exception to the
doctrine of mutuality." See, e.g., In re Miller's Estate, 230 P.2d 667, 677-78 (Cal. Dist.
Ct. App. 1951).
9. See supra note 8.
10. See Currie, Mutuality of Collateral Estoppel: Limits of the Bernhard Doctrine,
9 STAx. L. REv. 281, 311-314 (1956).
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This reasoning has been extended by recent decisions so that an
unfavorable determination of an issue in one action may constitute a
valid defense for a second defendant in a second action by the identical
plaintiff. A similar conclusion may obtain where the present plaintiff was
an unsuccessful defendant in a former judgment. However, this latter
defensive variation represents one further step in a progressive departure
from the ideal of unrestricted access to the legal tribunals inasmuch as
the foreclosed party has had no opportunity to select that forum before
which he may most advantageously present his grievance. A smaller
number of courts have agreed to sanction that foreclosure. 1
A parallel situation exists in the affirmative use of estoppel. In their
most venturesome attack thus far on mutuality, the California courts
permitted a second plaintiff to avail himself of a judgment rendered
against a party who had been the plaintiff in the earlier trial.12 Significantly, in a factual situation similar to DeWitt, the same court has
since declined to use a judgment adverse to the defendant to aid a second
plaintiff." New York, by extending the consequences of a suit for the
unsuccessful defendant, now stands virtually along among the states. 4
Thus, representing as it does the extreme gradation on a scale of
possible variations, the factual holding in DeWitt supports-if the
statement's application is restricted to New York-the comment that
mutuality is a dead letter. Evidently the plea of mutuality will not again
be raised in its courts.'" This decisive pronouncement will likely provide
a clearer impetus for innovation in other jurisdictions by virtue of its
elimination of a dichotomy of authority in New York which had been
perpetuated by several less lucid opinions."
11.

For a summary of recent cases see Currie, Civil Procedure: The Tempest

Brews,53 CAIF. L. REV. 25 (1965).

12. Hardware Mut. Ins. Co. v. Valentine, 119 Cal. App. 2d 125, 259 P.2d 70 (1953).
13. Nevarov v. Caldwell, 161 Cal. App. 2d 762, 327 P.2d 111 (1958). Immediately
prior to DeWitt New York courts had been accurately characterized as more conservative
in wielding estoppel than their California counterparts. See Note, Mutuality of
Estoppel: McCourt v. Algiers in Context, 1967 Wis. L. REv. 267, 277.
14. In Gorski v. Commercial Ins. Co., 206 F. Supp. 11 (E.D. Wis. 1962) the federal
court purported to apply Wisconsin law in a holding which parallels DeWitt but this
interpretation appears inaccurate. See Note, Mutuality of Estoppel: McCourt v. Algiers
in Context, supra note 13, at 286, 287. Apparently not all courts choose to recognize the
issue. In Barbour v. Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co., 143 F. Supp. 506 (E.D. III. 1956), the
court reasoned that since Illinois permits suits for consortium a husband may affirmatively use a personal injury judgment in favor of his wife. Mutuality is not discussed.
DeWitt is not without precedent in the federal courts. See cases cited notes 22-24 infra
and accompanying text.
15. See infra notes 33, 34 and accompanying text. The court expressly refrained
from discussing the situation in which former codefendants confront each other.
16. For an analysis in detail of the "confusing and ambiguous" recent decisions
see Note, Collateral Estoppel in New York, 36 N.Y.U.L. REv. 1158 (1961).
That an offensive exercise of estoppel was ruled out by two earlier cases, Elder v.
New York & Pa. Express Inc., 284 N.Y. 350, 31 N.E.2d 188 (1940), and Haverhill v.
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The explanation for the demise of mutuality lies in the desirability
of shielding former litigants from extended harassment and, of course,
in the necessity of clearing crowded dockets." Nonetheless, the fear has
been expressed that the offensive use of estoppel, such as was approved
in DeWitt, is less than a panacea, given the inducement which it may
provide to would-be-plaintiffs for whom the burden of a law suit would
otherwise prove discouraging. 8 Of course to the extent to which the
otherwise sacrificed causes are meritorious, the thrust of this intended
criticism has been controverted. In addition, the policy's effectiveness in
expediting matters may to some extent be diminished by the incentive
which it may create for excessively thorough litigation by defense counsel
of inconsequential matters in order to forestall detrimental future use of
judgments. 0 The dissenter in DeWitt joined numerous commentators
who have deplored the possibility that an ostensibly innocuous contest
involving minor property damage toward the conduct of which the defense may be reluctant to devote substantial resources may produce ramifications of unforeseen dimensions.2" Finally, trial of difficult cases by
proxy, i.e., by strategic manipulation of the initial party and jurisdiction
so as to produce the ideal test case, may become fashionable among
zealous personal injury counsel.2'
International Ry. Co., 244 N.Y. 582, 155 N.E. 905 (1927), appears to have been the
conclusion of several lower courts and the Appellate Division's judgment for the defendant in DeWitt had been commended as in accord with the law in Note, 32 BRooxylN L.
Rv. 428 (1967). See, Quatroche v. Consolidated Edison Co., 11 App. Div. 2d 665, 201
N.Y.S.2d 520 (1960) ; Goodman v. Kirshberg, 261 App. Div. 257, 25 N.Y.S.2d 13 (1941) ;
Bisnoff v. Herman, 260 App. Div. 663, 23 N.Y.S.2d 719 (1940) ; Contra, Kinney v. State,
191 Misc. 218, 75 N.Y.S.2d 784 (1947).
The Court of Appeals was able to cite two of its own prior decisions as authority:
Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Colon & Co., 260 N.Y. 305, 183 N.E. 506 (1932), and United
Mut. Fire Ins. Co. v. Saeli, 297 N.Y. 611, 75 N.E.2d 626 (1947). The precedent value of
the former is weakened by its disposition under a workmen's compensation statute, the
affirmative use being ascribed to legislative intent. The latter ruling countenanced
affirmative use in fact but its brief exposition of the subject was sufficiently opaque to
permit its dismissal by the lower courts. The court did find it necessary to expressly
overrule conflicting authority and one must ultimately conclude that the law of New
York has been notably altered.
17. "Behind the phrase res judicata lies a rule of reason and practical necessity. One
who has had his day in court should not be allowed to litigate the question anew." Good
Health Dairy Corp. v. Emery, 275 N.Y. 14, 18, 9 N.E.2d 758, 759 (1937) quoted in B.R.
DeWitt Inc. v. Hall. 19 N.Y.2d 141, 144, 278 N.Y.S.2d 596, 599, 225 N.E.2d 195, 197
(1967). "It is a regognition of the need of finality to litigation ... a rule of rest" Haverhill v. International R. Co., 217 App. Div. 521 (1926), aff'd, 244 N.Y. 582, 155 N.E. 905
(1927).
18. Thames, Mutuality supra note 8.
19. The most widely cited defenses of mutuality appear in von Moschzisker supra
note 2, and Moore & Currier, supra note 5.
20. B.R. DeWitt Inc. v. Hall, 19 N.Y.2d 141, 149, 278 N.Y.S.2d 596, 602, 225 N.E.2d
195, 199 (1967) (dissenting opinion) and authorities cited therein.
21. This phenomenon has evidently been observed on occasion in California. See,
Nevarov v. Caldwell, 161 Cal. App. 2d 762, 327 P.2d 111 (1958).
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The experience of a few federal courts which have pioneered in
allowing the affirmative employment of collateral estoppel so as to serve
public advantage probably indicates the disposition to be made of these
newly spawned difficulties. The Second Circuit's opinion in Zdanok v.
Glidden Co.,22 resembling that of DeWitt, cautiously limited its holding
to the facts at bar and the court refused to apply this holding to a later
case on the grounds of factual disimilarity since the amount in controversy was not great, the defendant had not litigated extensively, appealed,
nor had any knowledge of the impending second suit."3 A district court
has applied the bar of estoppel to a subsequent case by virtue of its having
been "litigated to the hilt by the most competent lawyers,"2 a consideration expressly mentioned in DeWitt." In so holding the federal
judiciary have not adopted inflexible rules of law which categorically
discard collateral estoppel where the party against whom the judgment is
invoked lacked the initiative in the original contest or where the issue
had been decided by a jury rather than a judge.
This case by case approach has garnered some vigorous approval26
and its adoption by New York and other states seems quite probable. In
a very influential New York decision, 7 the defensive use of mutuality
was spurned and "identity of issues" was reputed to be the criterion for
application of estoppel. While the extent to which this may constitute
the sole criterion has remained in question, one recent decision29
would seem to evince some predisposition on the court's part to consider
all of the circumstances involved.
In the process of invalidating conflicting earlier precedent the
DeWitt opinion pointedly declined to overrule all such cases. Direct
reference was made to only one such decision,"0 which was struck down
"because its outcome was dictated by want of mutuality."3 1 This hesitancy
may be construed as an implicit indication that some of the results
achieved in another era through mutuality may survive the doctrine itself
where desirable and, presumably, this ideal would necessarily be attained
22. 288 F.2d 99 (2d Cir. 1961).
23. Berner v. British Com'wlth, Airlines, 346 F.2d 532 (2d Cir. 1965).
24. United States v. United Airlines Inc., 216 F. Supp. 709, 728 (E.D. Wash. 1962).
25. B.R. DeWitt Inc. v. Hall, 19 N.Y.2d 141, 148, 278 N.Y.S.2d 596, 601, 225 N.E.2d
195, 199 (1967).
26. Currie, Civil Procedure,supra note 11; Thames, Mutuality, supra note 8.
27. Israel v. Wood Dolson Co., 1 N.Y.2d 116, 151 N.Y.S.2d 1, 134 N.E.2d 97 (1956).
28. Note, 32 BRooKLYN L. REv. 428 (1967).
29. Cummings v. Dresher, 18 N.Y.2d 105, 271 N.Y.S.2d 976, N.E.2d 688 (1965).
Noted, 41 ST. JOHN's L. Ray. 148 (1966).
30. Haverhill v. International Ry. Co., 244 N.Y. 353, 155 N.E. 905 (1927). See
note 16 supra.
31. B.R. DeWtit Inc. v. Hall, 19 N.Y.2d 141, 147, 278 N.Y.S.2d 596, 601, 225 N.E.2d
195, 198 (1967).
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by a weighing of the equities of each case.2
One additional factor suggests the undesirability of indulging in a
blind application of estoppel whenever the issues presented are identical;
if a defendant were found negligent while his co-defendant were held
blameless, mutuality prevents use of that decision in a subsequent action
by the latter against the former.3 3 However, under the identical issue
doctrine, the earlier decision is controlling. 4 Manifestly in some instances
the co-defendants are preoccupied with the common adversary and fail to
raise factors relevant to a dispute among themselves. While a solution
may be found in the assertion that negligence as to the plaintiff was the
initial issue and therefore the identity requisite is not met, the circumstantial analysis introduced by the federal courts represents an effective
method of disposition.
The one material consequence of the demise of mutuality which is
not readily amenable to solution is so-called multiple claimant anomaly.
Although the judgments against a defendant such as a common carrier
may be numerous in the event of an accident, the requirement of due
process dictates that each victim be permitted to try the question anew.
Nonetheless, should any one in a long succession of attempts prove
successful-and the "law of averages" suggests the likelihood of an
occasional aberration in any such series-the hapless carrier forfeits all
future suits notwithstanding repeated prior demonstrations of proper
conduct.
While one's instinctive reaction to the inequity may often be mollified by the defendant's corporate identity, the emotions of those claimants
who emerged from court penniless and now look on in horror as others
suddenly collect handsome sums without effort must also be considered.
The scholar may dismiss such inconsistency as an implicit consequence
32.

This analysis must face one factual hurdle. Haverhill v. International Ry. Co.,

244 N.Y. 353, 155 N.E. 905 (1927) which rejected affirmative use of estoppel, was
expressly overruled. Yet the Appellate Division stressed that the defendant had been
sued in an inferior court on a small claim and had not actively defended himself. The
DeWitt opinion declined to list Elder v. New York & Pa. Express Inc., 284 N.Y. 350,
31 N.E.2d 188 (1940), as overruled although the immediately preceding paragraph had
been devoted to a discussion of Elder and Haverhill. In Elder, which also denied a third
party plaintiff's plea of estoppel, the defendant had been cast in the role of plaintiff in
the prior action, and as the dissent pointed out, the case appears from the reports to have
been actively contested. Thus application of the suggested approach appears on the surface
to yield a result diametrically opposed to that which could be argued to be implicit in the
opinion. On balance, however, it appears most likely that the court did not have the
particular fact situation uppermost in mind and overruled Haverhill for the very reason
indicated, viz., the opinion -appeared to rely on mutuality as such.
33. Glaser v. Hette, 232 App. Div. 119, 249 N.Y. Supp. 374, aff'd, 256 N.Y. 686, 177
N.E. 193 (1931); Minkoff v. Brenner, 10 N.Y.2d 1030, 225 N.Y.S.2d 47, 180 N.E.2d

434 (1962).
34.

(1956).

Israel v. Wood Dolson Co., 1 N.Y.2d 116, 151 N.Y.S.2d 1, 134 N.E.2d 97
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of our Anglo-American trial system in which the inhabitants of a less
than ideal society content themselves with having had "a sporting
chance" at justice. This contention, however, provides no relief to the
populace, who are requested to place their collective trust in institutions
containing such glaring imperfections.
As previously suggested a court may closely scrutinize the factual
posture of each case and grant the plea of estoppel with selectivity. The
court could forthrightly identify the multiple claimant anomaly as its
ratio decidendi. This represents the least complex approach. Regrettably
it can not be purported to in any way expedite the efficient administration
of litigation. Moreover, denial of the plea in those instances in which
a verdict favorable to the plaintiff has been delivered subsequent to at
least one other trial in which the defendant has been exculpated may be
received as a tacit admission of the dubious propriety of a decision.
A more elaborate solution has for various reasons found favor with
several academicians :" courts and legislatures should sanction broader
employment of some form of compulsory joinder. Given the unwieldy
numbers concerned, the fictional or "spurious" class action seems ideal;
a Supreme Court dictum has asserted the constitutionality of binding
all would-be claimants,37 assuming adequate representation and fair
notice.
Nonetheless, no such remedy has been adopted by any state or
federal jurisdiction. Under section 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, any party wishing to remain exempt may do so. A few federal decisions38 have authorized class members to intervene subsequent to
judgment, which, it will be noted, represents still another form of repudiation of mutuality. These class rules, however, due to their voluntary
nature fail to perform the role which might be theirs. Indeed, by recent
amendment all potential members are notified of pending action and only
those who file an indication of their intention to remain unbound will be
so held. Determination of these parties' status is made prior to the
judgment and thus even the limited utility of subsequent intervention is
apparently no longer of pertinence."8 Similarly, that minority of states
which do recognize the spurious class action adhere to federal procedure
35. Hansberry v. Lee, 311 U.S. 32 (1940); discussed in 3 J. MOORE, FEDmL
PLAcrIcE § 23.11 (2d ed. 1948).
36. Simeone, Procedural Problems of Class Suits, 60 MICH. L. REv. 905 (1960);
Van Dercreek, The "Is" and "Ought" of Class Actions under Federal Rule 23, 48
IOWA L. Rzv. 273 (1963).
37. Hansberry v. Lee, 311 U.S. 32 (1940).
38. Union Carbide Corp. v. Nisley, 300 F.2d 561 (10th Cir. 1962) ; State Wholesale
Grocers v. Great Ati. & Pac. Tea Co., 24 F.R.D. 510 (N.D. Ill. 1959).
39. See Simon, Class Actions under Amended Rule 23, 12 ANTITRUST BULL. 187

(1967).
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in not binding absentee parties.4"
The class action operates harshly in forcing one's acquiescence to
the opinion of others as to trial tactics. A representative plaintiff must
be selected. Collusive suits sacrificing the rights of the remainder of the
class constitute a hazard. To the extent to which collateral matters differ
with each claimant, additional subsequent litigation may ensue, and to the
extent to which such matters are included, the greater the complexities
to be fathomed by a jury."
In addition, it has been prophesied that in combination with the
contingent fee such rules would create "an unseemly rush to bring the
first case and provide, through notice to all injured persons, a kind of
legalized ambulance chasing."4" One commentator on the class action in
New York has, in fact, concluded that the innovation of class actions in
the negligence field is unwarranted in view of what does, as a matter
of record, appear to be a reasonably comforting paucity of serious problems.43 This comment, of course, antedates the potential situation
created by DeWitt and, while stressing the apparent natural tendency
toward voluntary referral to specialist attorneys with the concomitant
consolidation of actions, its author, nonetheless, applauds the action of a
New York lower court in requiring several plaintiffs to consolidate their
negligence actions against a bus company." It is recognized that even
without statutory mandate courts have wide discretion in consolidating
actions which have already been filed45 and an increasing willingness to
exercise that power, even to the extent of reaching different jurisdictions
within a given state,46 has been necessitated by rising accident rates.
Liberalization of class action procedure may be defended as a mere
extension of this tendency.
At present the multiple claimant anomaly exists merely by virtue of
the facile imaginations of a spate of writers who have chosen to direct
passing attention to it in hypothetical fashion. The appearances of this
40. For a list of cases see Simeone, ProceduralProblems,supra note 37 at 920.
41. General discussions of the class action appear in Van Dercreek, The "Is" and
"Ought" of Class Actions under Federal Rule 23, supra note 37; Simeone, Procedural
Problems, supra note 37; and Developments in the Law -- Multiparty Litigation in the
FederalCourts, 71 HARv. L. REV. 874 (1950).

42. Weinstein, Revision of Procedure: Some Problems in Class Actions, 9 BUFF.
L. REv. 433, 469 (1960).
43. Id. at 469.
44. Chudyk v.Fifth Avenue Coach Lines, 6 App. Div. 2d 1003, 177 N.Y.S.2d 981
(1958).
45. See, e.g., Trusler v. Galambos, 238 Ind. 195, 149 N.E.2d 550 (1958) : "The rule
is well settled ... that trial courts do have the inherent power to consolidate causes in
proper cases to expedite administration of justice." Id. at 200, 149 N.E.2d at 552.
46. See, e.g., Balz v. Kauffman and Minteer, Inc., 285 App. Div. 1206, 140 N.Y.S.2d
902 (1955) ; Rubenstein v. Silbert, 200 Misc. 399, 106 N.Y.S.2d 304 (1951).
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phenomenon may perhaps be rare, particularly in view of the club which
one or a series of judgments would represent in the hands of the successful defendant who insures against future suits by extrajudicial settlement.
The consequence of this remoteness is the unlikelihood of anticipatory
procedural reform whatever the theoretical merit of such proposals,
although evidence of manipulation in the bringing of test cases could
prove a more compelling prod for action. To the extent to which the objective of the DeWitt case is attained, possible public outrage at the multiple claimant problem must be balanced against one very present reality:
popular alienation inspired by the several years delay common to trials
and appeals.
In repudiating in its entirety the doctrine of mutuality of estoppel,
New York has dislodged an anachronism dating back to an era in which
rules occasionally existed simply for the sake of rules and which, through
indiscriminate application, created that particular brand of injustice which
is born of duplication and delay. In its stead should be substituted a rule
of judicial discretion directed to the relevant facets of each case.
William R. Pietz

